Thursday, 25 April 2013

Medium Neutral Citation
Attorney General v Budd [2013] NSWSC 155
Hearing Dates
5 July 2012, 6 July 2012
Decision Date
19/04/2013
Before
Hall J
Decision
(1) Pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, Pamela Joan Theresa Budd is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales other than with leave of an appropriate court under that Act
(2) The defendant is to pay the plaintiff's costs on the ordinary basis.
(3) Defendant's application under the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 refused.
Catchwords
PROCEDURE - application for vexatious proceedings order pursuant to s 8 Vexatious Proceedings Act - whether proceedings are vexatious - meaning of "vexatious" - whether proceedings were conducted frequently - meaning of "frequently"

SUPPRESSION ORDERS - application by defendant to suppress identity in judgment and orders made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 - issue as to impact of publicity upon defendant's mental health - powers of the Court to make a suppression order under the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 not available to suppress judgment and orders under Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, in particular having regard to the statutory scheme requiring public notification of any orders made under that Act
Legislation Cited
Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010
Evidence Act 1995
Freedom of Information Act 1989
Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008
Cases Cited
Attorney General in and for the State of NSW v Gargan [2010] NSWSC 1192
Attorney General of NSW v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008
Attorney General v Chan (2011) NSWSC 1315
Attorney General v Croker [2010] NSWSC 942
Budd v Department of Housing (Tenancy) [2004] NSWCTTT 622
Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2005] FCA 1264
Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2005] FCA 1478
Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2006] FCA 1131
Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2007] FCAFC 24
Budd v New South Wales Commissioner of Police [2006] NSWSC 1265
Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] FCA 1540
Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2009] FCA 345
Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] AATA 137
Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 961
Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 1138
Budd v State of NSW [2006] NSWADT 14
Budd v State of NSW [2006] NSWSC 1266
Budd v State of NSW [2007] NSWADT 112
Budd v State of NSW [2007] NSWADT 88
Budd v State of NSW [2007] NSWADTAP 55
Budd v State of NSW [2008] NSWADT 217
Budd v State of NSW [2008] NSWADT 239
Budd v University of Sydney [2010] NSWADT 77
Budd v Victims Compensation Corporation Fund [2009] NSWDC 35
NZ v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADT 35
NZ v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADTAP 61
NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2006] NSWADT 126
NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2007] NSWADTAP 20
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398
Pascoe v Liprini [2011] NSWSC 1485
PLFX v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 464
Rinehart v Welker [2011] NSWCA 403
White Industries (QLD) Pty Limited v Flower and Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169
Category
Principal judgment
Parties
Attorney General (Plaintiff)
Pamela Joan Theresa Budd (Defendant)
Representation
Crown Solicitor's Office (Plaintiff)
Unrepresented (Defendant)

N Owens (Plaintiff)
D Provera (Defendant)
File Number(s)
2011/183830

Judgment

1HIS HONOUR: By summons filed on 3 June 2011 the Attorney General of NSW seeks orders pursuant to s 8 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 ("the Act") in relation to the defendant, Pamela Joan Theresa Budd.
2The orders sought pursuant to s 8(7) of the Act are:
(1)That the defendant be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales without leave of the Court; and
(2)That all proceedings already instituted by the defendant be stayed.
3The application has been instigated by the defendant's involvement in 25 different proceedings between 28 October 2004 and 23 March 2010.

The Evidence

4The plaintiff read the affidavit of Sharon Larysa Ohnesorge of 11 June 2011. One volume of material containing the 25 decisions of the various courts and tribunals relating to proceedings in which the defendant has been involved were exhibited to that affidavit.
5The plaintiff also relied upon a further affidavit of Sharon Larysa Ohnesorge of 28 June 2012 which included annexures evidencing enquiries the plaintiff made to registries of various courts and tribunals to ascertain whether the defendant has any proceedings on foot, correspondence with the defendant enclosing a Notice to Admit Facts, and pleadings filed in District Court proceeding 2011/143828 which have been instituted by the defendant and are currently on foot.
6The affidavit material was admitted without objection.
7The Notice to Admit Facts required the defendant to admit that she was the party referred to as "PLFX" in PLFX v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 464 and that she was the party referred to as "NZ" in the following proceedings:
(1)NZ v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADT 35
(2)NZ v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADTAP 61
(3)NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2006] NSWADT 126
(4)NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2007] NSWADTAP 20
8There is no evidence that the defendant responded to the Notice in order to dispute those facts.
9The plaintiff tendered Short Minutes of Order dated 14 July 2012. The orders sought were substantially the same as those sought in the Summons initiating these proceedings except that the plaintiff did not seek to have District Court proceeding 2011/143828 stayed given that the defendant is represented by solicitors who have formally signed to say that those proceedings have reasonable prospects of success.
10The plaintiff submitted that the evidence was that there were no other proceedings involving the defendant on foot. The plaintiff did not press for order 2 of the Summons and instead asked for liberty to apply to the Court to seek appropriate relief in the event that between the hearing date and delivery of judgment the plaintiff became aware of new proceedings commenced by the defendant.
11The defendant did not wish to be heard on this point and I granted liberty for the plaintiff to apply in the event that any other proceedings were brought before any tribunal or court.
12The plaintiff tendered a Statement of Agreed Facts of 6 July 2012 in accordance with s 191(3)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995, signed by both parties' legal representatives.
13The facts not in dispute were:
(1)That an order for costs was made against the defendant in each of the following proceedings or applications:
(a)Budd v New South Wales Commissioner of Police [2006] NSWSC 1265
(b)Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2005] FCA 1264
(c)Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2006] FCA 1131
(d)Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2007] FCAFC 24
(e)Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] FCA 1540
(f)Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2009] FCA 345
(g)Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 961
(h)Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 1138
(2)None of the costs orders referred to at (1) have been discharged, varied or set aside;
(3)The defendant has not paid, whether in whole or in part, any of the costs orders referred to above; and
(4)The defendant has not settled or compromised her liability under the costs orders referred to above.
14An affidavit of the defendant of 23 February 2012 was read. The plaintiff objected to a number of paragraphs (paragraphs 8, 21, 26-29, 38, 53-56). The affidavit was admitted subject to my rulings as to the relevance of certain paragraphs and the possible admission of others for their use as evidence of an opinion held by the defendant.
15The affidavit annexed a number of letters from medical practitioners and community leaders, orders made by the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal ("CTTT") and copies of two testamurs from the University of Sydney in relation to a Bachelor of Arts and a Masters of Arts (Philosophy) that the defendant had been awarded. The plaintiff objected to each annexure aside from the orders by the CTTT. Each contested annexure was provisionally admitted subject to its relevance. The letters from medical practitioners and community leaders were admitted subject to their use as evidencing contemporaneous reports of the problems the defendant was facing rather than the to prove the truth of the allegations contained within them.

The Legislative Scheme

16Section 8(1)(a) of the Act provides that a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person may be made where an "authorised court" is satisfied "the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia". Section 3 of the Act defines this Court as an "authorised court".
17Section 8(2) of the Act provides that for the purposes of subsection (1), an authorised court may have regard to:
"(a) proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section), and
(b) orders made by any Australian court or tribunal (including orders made before the commencement of this section)."
18Section 8(3) of the Act provides that an authorised court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.
19Section 8(4) of the Act provides that the Attorney General has standing to bring an application under the Act.
20Section 4 of the Act defines "proceedings" as including:
"(a) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceedings, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal, and
(b) any proceedings (including any interlocutory proceedings) taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court or tribunal, and
(c) any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way."
21Section 5(1) of the Act defines "institute", in relation to proceedings, as including:
"(a) for civil proceedings--the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started against or in relation to a party, and
(b) for proceedings before a tribunal--the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started before the tribunal, and
(c) for criminal proceedings--the making of a complaint or the obtaining of a warrant for the arrest of an alleged offender, and
(d) for civil or criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal--the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary to start an appeal in relation to the proceedings or to a decision made in the course of the proceedings."
22Section 6 of the Act defines "vexatious proceedings", as including:
"(a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal, and
(b) proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose, and
(c) proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and
(d) proceedings conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose."

Legal Principles

23The test under s 8(1)(a) requires that before making a vexatious proceedings order, the Court must be satisfied that the person instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings as defined by s 6 and then that those proceedings have been instituted or conducted frequently.
24It is therefore necessary to review the proceedings involving the defendant relied upon by the plaintiff as being vexatious in order to first determine whether, if any, of the proceedings are vexatious and, if so, then to determine whether they have been frequently instituted or conducted. It is not sufficient that a litigant had instituted a number of vexatious proceedings if the adverb "frequently" could not be used in connection with the sum of them: Attorney General of NSW v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008 per Davies J at [10]-[11].
25In Attorney General in and for the State of NSW v Gargan [2010] NSWSC 1192, Davies J set out the relevant principles as follows:
"[7] I discussed in Attorney General of NSW v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008 at [9]-[17] the principles associated with the making of an order under s 8(1)(a) of the Act. Those matters may be summarised as follows:
(a) the test of "frequently" is a less demanding test than was required under s 84 Supreme Court Act 1970;
(b) the term "frequently" is a relative term and must be looked at in the context of the litigation being considered;
(c) the number of proceedings considered may be small if the proceedings are an attempt to re-litigate an issue already determined against the person;
(d) regard may be had to applications made by the person in proceedings commenced against that person;
(e) regard may be had to the way the person has behaved and conducted himself or herself in the proceedings before the Court;
(f) regard may be had to proceedings in any Australian court or tribunal;
(g) regard may be had to the findings and result in the proceedings under consideration.
[8] In these proceedings, reference has been made to the judgment of Perram J in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398 where his Honour eloquently expresses the principles relating to vexatious litigants at [2]-[12]. Whilst acknowledging that the test his Honour had to consider was the test under s 84 Supreme Court Act and is, as I have noted, a more demanding test than is required under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, much of what his Honour sets out is relevant to the determination in the present case.
[2] A comprehensive explanation of what makes a proceeding vexatious is difficult to proffer for the boundary between the persistent and over-zealous on the one hand, and the vexatious on the other, may at times be indistinct. However, the following principles are, at least, well-established. First, the making of such an order is an extreme remedy depriving its object of recourse to the enforcement of the law which is every citizen's ordinary right. It is, therefore, not lightly to be made.
[3] Secondly, the purpose of the order is not to impose condign punishment for past litigious misdeeds; it serves instead to shield both the public, whose individual members might be molested by vexatious proceedings, and the Court itself, whose limited resources and needs must be carefully managed and protected from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits.
[4] Thirdly, as might naturally be expected, such a severe power is not enlivened by the mere single occurrence of a vexatious claim. To err is human and transient lapses of judgment, even serious ones, may be found in the most reasonable of places. Instead, the power to make the order is conditional upon the litigant having commenced not only a single vexatious proceeding but also upon having commenced similar such proceedings in this Court or in other Australian courts.
[5] Fourthly, the qualities of vexation to which O 21 is addressed are to be found, as the terms of r 1(1) show, in the commencement by the litigant of proceedings which lack reasonable grounds and where the litigant's institution of such proceedings may fairly be said to be both habitual and persistent.
[6] Fifthly, whether a proceeding is instituted without reasonable grounds is a different question to, although not wholly disconnected from, the inquiry into a proceeding's legal merits. The wheat, no doubt, must be separated from the chaff but in this area the question is whether what is before the Court contains any wheat at all. Although, often enough, no great guidance is obtained by exchanging one formula of words with another, it will be usually of some assistance, limited perhaps, to ask whether the issues brought to the Court for determination are manifestly hopeless or devoid of merit. It is, in that context, important to distinguish the difficult from the ridiculous and the unlikely from the hopeless.
[7] Sixthly, although the ways in which unreasonable grounds may manifest themselves are myriad, one form often to be found in the baggage of the vexatious is a failure, often a refusal, to understand the principles of finality of litigation which rescue court and litigant alike from a Samsara of past forensic encounters.
[8] Seventhly, it is the related quality of repetition which underpins, in part, a need for the institution of the proceedings to deserve the appellations habitual and persistent. The litigant's conduct will be habitual where the commencement of proceedings occurs as a matter of course when appropriate conditions for their commencement are present as was explained by Roden J in Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 492. That formulation may not wholly explain the litigant who commences proceedings on any occasion and without the presence of any conditions, whether appropriate or otherwise. In such cases, the idea of constant repetition driven by habit and symptomatic of an inability not to engage in the behaviour may be more useful. Persistence, on the other hand, generally suggests stubborn determination but, in the context of the vexatious, carries with it the capacity to endure failure beyond the point at which a rational person would abandon the field.
[9] Eighthly, each of these notions - the want of reasonable grounds, habitual institution and persistent institution - are to be gauged objectively. But this does not mean that a litigant's own protestation as to his or her own mental state is irrelevant; frequently enough, the vexatious are betrayed out of their own mouths. Rather, the need for objective determination protects courts from the vexatious litigant who is genuinely, but misguidedly, persuaded as to the correctness of his or her own conduct.
[10] Ninthly, the power to make the order arises when proceedings commenced in the way described are found to exist. But the notion of a proceeding is a broad one including a substantive proceeding directed at the attainment of final relief and collateral applications within such a proceeding; further, it extends outside the proceeding itself and embraces appeals there from and applications which, whilst not made in the proceeding, are properly to be seen as collateral thereto - so much flows from the definition of proceeding in s 4 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
...
[12] Finally, once it is concluded that the Court's power to prevent a litigant from commencing or pursuing proceedings has been enlivened, the considerations germane to the exercise of that power are unconfined. However, the factors which will be relevant are informed by the protective purpose which the order serves. Where a litigant displays insight into their previous litigious history this will, no doubt, be relevant for it will suggest - although not determine - a diminution in the risk posed to the public. On the other hand, the manner in which a litigant conducts herself in her affairs generally is also capable of throwing light on whether the commencement of further vexatious proceedings is likely. Those general affairs include the litigant's defence to the proceedings by which the order restraining him is sought. Because of the protective nature of the jurisdiction it is also relevant to know the extent of the damage and inconvenience the litigant's forays into the courts have caused, pecuniary or otherwise."

The Defendant's Litigation History

26In making an order under s 8 of the Act, it is for the Court to form its own view about each proceeding relied upon by the plaintiff however it is entitled to have regard to the result of the proceedings, and where appropriate, the findings of, and views expressed by, the various judicial officers who dealt with them: Attorney General v Croker [2010] NSWSC 942 at [125]; Wilson at [22].
27A very useful summary of the defendant's litigation history consisting of 25 different proceedings has been created by agreement between both parties. That summary is included as a schedule to this judgment.

The Plaintiff's Submissions

28The plaintiff submitted that 24 of those 25 proceedings were vexatious in that they were instituted or pursued without reasonable prospects of success and/or were otherwise an abuse of process. In each of those 24 proceedings an adverse decision was made against the defendant.
29The plaintiff does not submit that the 25th proceeding, NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2006] NSWADT 126, was vexatious given that the Administrative Decisions Tribunal ("ADT") granted an order of interim relief in favour of the defendant.
30In its written submissions, the plaintiff referred to the decision of Croker supra and identified some circumstances that had been held to be an abuse of process:
(1)The pursuit of proceedings that have no prospect of success, or no real prospect of resulting in a remedy of any substance, but which involved unjustifiable expense or use of judicial resources (at [17]);
(2)The pursuit of concurrent proceedings for substantially the same relief, or the pursuit of fresh proceedings after unremedied default in previous proceedings (at [17]);
(3)A determination to persist with futile appeals in the face of repeated judicial observations that arguments were doomed to failure (at [133]); and
(4)To cause others to incur legal costs in responding to hopeless applications, in circumstances where they have blithely disregarded costs orders made against them (at [134]).
31In assessing whether proceedings had no reasonable prospects of success, it was submitted that the Court is entitled to have regard to the result of the proceedings and the findings of the judicial officers that decided them but that the Court need not go behind the findings of a judge to the merits of that decision, as would be appropriate on an appeal.
32As to the term "frequently", the plaintiff referred to the decision in Pascoe v Liprini [2011] NSWSC 1485 where the Court held:
"The term 'frequently' is relative; it must be looked at in the context of the litigation being considered. It is not necessary for a person to commence a large number of proceedings in order for it to be said that the person has done so frequently. The individual number of proceedings can be quite small if, for example, they are an attempt to re-litigate an issue already determined against the person" (at [14] citations omitted).
33The plaintiff also highlighted that to deprive anyone the right to access the courts was a very serious matter and therefore an order under s 8 should not be made lightly.
34The plaintiff further submitted that the purpose of an order under s 8 is not intended to punish the defendant or to suggest that there was no explanation for why the defendant acted in the way she did in commencing litigation but to shield the public and the courts from the expense and further inconvenience of baseless suits.
35The plaintiff's written submissions also provided an outline of the general features of the defendant's litigation history which support the making of an order under s 8, which can be summarised as follows:
(1)Lacking in merits and both factually and legally misconceived;
(2)Frequent multiple appeals from initial unfavourable decisions;
(3)Frequently conducts separate litigation raising the same or similar issues;
(4)The manner in which the defendant conducts litigation is unfocussed, unhelpful and likely to cause both her opponents and the courts to waste time and resources;
(5)The defendant's medical condition (from which she continues to suffer, details of which are established in reports in evidence) appears to explain both the substantive content of her litigation and the manner in which she conducts it.
36An outline of the defendant's litigation history of 25 different proceedings was contained in the plaintiff's written submissions. In its oral submissions, the plaintiff categorised 23 of those proceedings as falling under ten different themes to demonstrate that they were vexatious within the meaning of s 6, with some proceedings falling under more than one theme. I will return to these themes shortly.
37It was also submitted that the 24th proceeding, Budd v University of Sydney [2010] NSWADT 77, was commenced without reasonable prospects of success. As the plaintiff did not categorise this proceeding as falling under any particular theme, it is convenient to outline the circumstances of that decision here.
38That proceeding concerned a complaint by the defendant against the University of Sydney alleging that it had discriminated against her by requiring a student of a Bachelor of Arts majoring in Biblical Studies to attend on campus for at least 75% of classes. The ADT held that the University had not refused to accept her enrolment application; rather it had indicated what would be expected of the defendant by way of attendance (at [13]). The ADT also held that the University had not imposed terms upon her admission; rather, the attendance requirement was a condition of the defendant being able to pass the course in which she was going to enrol.
39The ADT found that even if the defendant's complaint to the ADT had been made after the University refused her enrolment application, her complaint would still have been dismissed in substance because the 75% attendance requirement was reasonable in the circumstances (at [22] and [24]). The ADT also held that requiring the course be taught without attendance would not have been an alternative means of providing the same course, rather, it would have required the University to conduct a different activity altogether (at [25]).

Theme 1: unintelligible applications

40The plaintiff submitted that there were four proceedings where the Tribunals and/or Courts were not able to discern what the defendant was seeking to agitate.
41The first proceeding, Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2005] FCA 1264, was an application by the defendant for judicial review of a decision by the Federal Privacy Commissioner. Hely J found that the defendant did not identify any error of law on the part of the Federal Privacy Commissioner and therefore adjourned proceedings on a number of occasions to enable her to obtain legal assistance and amend her application.
42The defendant did not obtain legal assistance but nevertheless filed an amended application. Hely J held that the amended application did not disclose "intelligible grounds of review" (at [6]) and dismissed the application with costs.
43The second proceeding, Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2005] FCA 1478, was an application for leave to appeal from the previous decision. The application was made out of time. Branson J held that the defendant "did not present, and still has not presented, an intelligible case for the respondent to answer" (at [3]) and dismissed the application.
44The third proceeding, Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2006] FCA 1131, was an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Federal Privacy Commission declining to investigate a complaint made by the defendant.
45Allsop J (as his Honour then was) held that the application "lacks any coherent basis of complaint" (at [2]). Following a number of opportunities for the defendant to clarify her complaint which resulted in her sending further supporting material, Allsop J found that there was "no single document which sets out in any convenient form [the defendant's] complaints" (at [16]) and concluded that he saw "no basis for any allegation that any ground of review exists" (at [20]). His Honour further held that "none of the material provided by [the defendant] whether by way of evidence or submission grounds any coherent claim" (at [21]). The application was therefore dismissed with costs.
46The fourth proceeding, Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 961, was an attempt to appeal from a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("AAT") (PLFX v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 464 discussed below at [54] and [118]). The AAT had affirmed a decision by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal which had affirmed Centrelink's decision to reject the defendant's application for a "crisis payment".
47Emmett J stated that the defendant's submissions made "assertions of denial of rights, denial of natural justice, errors of law, denial of rights to justice, severe injustice and denial of legal rights. However, there is no logical argument or reasoning contained in the submission in support of such assertions" (at [12]).
48Leave was granted allowing the defendant to file an amended Notice of Appeal. Emmett J found that the Amended Notice was "embarrassing", "highly repetitious", and "quite incomprehensible in many respects" (at [18]). The application was summarily dismissed with costs.

Theme 2: voluminous material

49The plaintiff submitted that there were five proceedings in which the defendant's conduct had a tendency to subject the parties in court to voluminous material.
50The first proceeding was again Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2005] FCA 1264 (discussed above at [41]) in which the plaintiff noted that the defendant had provided the solicitors for the Federal Privacy Commissioner with 775 pages of material and had filed numerous documents with the Court.
51The second proceeding was again Budd v Privacy Commissioner [2006] FCA 1131 (discussed above at [44]) in which the plaintiff filed six bundles of documents comprising of over 1,100 pages before Allsop J.
52The third proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2008] NSWADT 239, was an application against the ADT itself because the ADT had restricted the times the defendant could communicate with the Registry.
53The plaintiff noted that the ADT found that the defendant had contacted the Registry numerous times on most days and engaged in lengthy conversations with different staff members raising the same issues repeatedly which prevented the staff from attending to other enquiries. The defendant had also regularly faxed lengthy materials, often up to 200 pages to the ADT, which prevented the ADT from receiving facsimiles from other parties (at [8]).
54The fourth proceeding, PLFX v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 464 (referred to above at [46]), was an application by the defendant to review a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal which affirmed Centrelink's decision rejecting her application for a "crisis payment". In that proceeding, the AAT had found that the defendant had filed "voluminous additional documentary material with the Tribunal" (at [9]).
55The plaintiff submitted that in the fifth proceeding, Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 961 (referred to above at [46]), which was an attempt to appeal the previous decision, Emmett J referred to numerous documents of 20 or 30 pages filed in court as repetitious and generally incomprehensible (at [15]-[16]).

Theme 3: complaints already declined by the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board

56The plaintiff submitted that there were four proceedings that commenced at a point where they had already been deemed as lacking in substance by the Anti-Discrimination Board ("ADB").
57In each of the four proceedings, Budd v State of NSW [2006] NSWADT 14, Budd v State of NSW [2007] NSWADT 88, Budd v State of NSW [2008] NSWADT 239 and Budd v State of NSW [2009] NSWADT 217, the defendant made an application under s 96 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 for permission to proceed with discrimination complaints that the President of the ADB had declined as lacking in substance.
58The first proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2006] NSWADT 14, involved two complaints.
59In relation to the first complaint, the defendant alleged that the Police had discriminated against her by knocking on her door and threatening to break it down during their investigations of an allegation that the defendant had breached an AVO made by her neighbour, Ms Gardiner
60The ADT held that in investigating an alleged breach of an AVO, the Police were not providing a "service" to the defendant (at [12]). Therefore her complaint had "no reasonable prospects of success" given that she had relied on provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 which only applied to the provision of "services".
61In relation to the second complaint, the defendant alleged that the Police had discriminated against her by not investigating her allegations against her sister in relation to a longstanding property dispute (at [4]).
62The ADT held that her complaint had "no reasonable prospects of success" because the decision to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes does not involve the provision of "services" to victims of crime (at [15]). The ADT therefore dismissed both her applications.
63The second proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2007] NSWADT 88, was in relation to two matters with the Police: a refusal by the Police to serve an application for an AVO and a request that the defendant not send facsimiles to the Police.
64The AVO complaint arose after the Registrar of the Local Court refused to issue a summons in response to the defendant's application for an AVO. The ADT found that since a summons was never issued it therefore followed that the Police never failed to serve it (at [7]-[8]).
65In relation to the facsimile restriction, the ADT found that unrestricted access to send documents by facsimile was not a "service" provided by the Police and therefore her complaint could not succeed (at [12]). Therefore the application was refused.
66The defendant's discrimination complaint in the third proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2008] NSWADT 239 (discussed above at [52]), involved restrictions on the times that she could communicate with the ADT Registry. The ADT held that it was unlikely that the defendant would be able to show that she was treated any differently to a person engaging in such conduct who did not have her disability and that the restrictions were reasonable (at [17]-[18]). Her complaint "does not have any reasonable prospects of success" (at [19]) and the ADT refused the application.
67The fourth proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2008] NSWADT 217, related to a complaint against a Ms Ramjan who had been appointed by the ADT to act as the defendant's representative in her dispute with the Department of Housing pursuant to s 71(4) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997. Ms Ramjan had settled those proceedings on behalf of the defendant.
68The defendant complained that Ms Ramjan had "failed to achieve promised outcomes" which "led to an exacerbation of her disabilities" (at [8]). She alleged that Ms Ramjan's failure to achieve those outcomes was due to discrimination against her on the ground of disability.
69The ADT refused the application on the basis that Ms Ramjan did not fail to provide a service to the defendant (at [32]), that Ms Ramjan did not treat the defendant less favourably on account of her disability than any non-disabled person (at [38]-[39]) and that Ms Ramjan did not require the defendant to comply with any requirement or condition with which she could not comply with by reason of her disability (at [41]). The ADT therefore concluded that the defendant's complaint had "no prospect of succeeding" (at [43]).

Theme 4: lack of jurisdiction

70The plaintiff submitted that there were four proceedings that were commenced by the defendant in circumstances where the procedural prerequisites for the Tribunal or Court to hear the proceedings were not satisfied.
71The first proceeding, NZ v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADT 35, related to two applications made by the defendant for review of conduct under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 ("PPIP Act") and for a review of a decision under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 ("FOI Act").
72In relation to the privacy application, the defendant filed the application prior to any notice being given to the Police or opportunity for the Police to conduct an internal review of her complaint (at [5]). Section 55 of the PPIP Act provides that a person may apply to the ADT after an internal review has been requested. The ADT found, therefore, that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the application because the agency in question had not had the opportunity to conduct an internal review (at [7]).
73In relation to the freedom of information ("FOI") application, the defendant had made what the ADT had understood as a "sufficiency of search objection" after she had made a FOI request to the Police. The defendant did not seek an internal review from the Police (at [15]). Section 53 of the FOI Act provides that the right to apply for review by the ADT is predicated on their having been first an internal review by the agency in question. The ADT, therefore, found that it did not have jurisdiction unless the agency in question had conducted an internal review (at [15]-[16]). Both applications were therefore dismissed.
74In the second proceeding, NZ v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADTAP 61, the defendant sought to appeal the previous decision. In relation to the privacy matter, the defendant sought to adduce further evidence. The ADT Appeal Panel ("Appeal Panel") refused this application because the evidence was available to her at the time of the Tribunal hearing and that there was nothing in the material that supported her assertion that she had in fact applied for an internal review (at [3]).
75In relation to the FOI matter, the defendant sought to challenge the ADT's finding that she had not sought an internal review. The Appeal Panel found that there was no evidence to support that contention (at [5]). The appeal was therefore dismissed.
76In the third proceeding, Budd v New South Wales Commissioner of Police [2006] NSWSC 1265, the defendant sought to appeal the previous decision of the Appeal Panel.
77Bell J identified a number of difficulties with the application noting that it was made out of time (at [15]-[17]), and that the relief claimed was inappropriate given that Supreme Court's jurisdiction in that proceeding was limited to appeals on questions of law (at [19]). Nevertheless the application was dealt with as a matter of substance.
78Bell J found that the proceedings were "manifestly hopeless" (at [26]) because the defendant's challenge to the finding that she had not sought an internal review was a question of fact, not law (at [23] and [25]) and that her challenge to the sufficiency of the reasons given for refusing to allow her to adduce fresh evidence could not be established (at [24]). The application was dismissed with costs.
79In the fourth proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2007] NSWADTAP 55, the defendant attempted to appeal from a previous decision by the ADT (Budd v State of NSW [2007] NSWADT 88 referred to above at [63]) in which the ADT refused to grant leave to the defendant to pursue two complaints against the Police alleging discrimination which had already been declined by the President of the ADB.
80Section 96(4) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 provides that there can be no appeal to the Appeal Panel against a refusal to grant leave to pursue a complaint that has been declined by the President of the ADB. Therefore, the Appeal Panel had no jurisdiction and the appeal was summarily dismissed (at [8]).

Theme 5: no evidence capable of supporting her case

81The plaintiff submitted that there were three proceedings in which the defendant adduced no evidence capable of supporting her case and that in one of those three instances she adduced evidence that was contrary to the legal case she was advancing.
82The first proceeding, Budd v Department of Housing (Tenancy) [2004] NSWCTTT 622, was an application by the defendant to the CTTT seeking to restrain the Department of Housing from invading her privacy and peace and comfort, requiring the Department to clean out the common area around her apartment and damages for pain and suffering.
83The CTTT noted that the defendant put on evidence about her mental health but no evidence to support her claim that the state of her common area was causing her serious inconvenience and required cleaning or that the Department of Housing had interfered with her privacy or quiet enjoyment.
84The Department of Housing put on evidence that it had never conducted client visits to the defendant's premises, that some of the pot plants that were in the common area had been removed and that the remaining pot plants were well maintained and the area kept neat. Therefore, the CTTT found that there was no basis to the defendant's claim and dismissed the application.
85The second proceeding, NZ v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADTAP 61 (discussed above at [74]), was an appeal of an earlier decision by the ADT (NZ v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADT 35, discussed above at [71]). The ADT had dismissed the defendant's application requesting reviews of conduct and decisions under the PPIP Act and FOI Act respectively.
86As outlined at [71]-[75], the defendant sought to adduce further evidence that she had sought an internal review by the Police in relation to both the FOI and privacy complaints. The Appeal Panel found that the evidence she sought to adduce was available at the time of the original hearing and that the evidence did not support her assertion that she had applied for an internal review. The plaintiff submitted that the Appeal Panel's findings constituted another example of proceedings where the fundamental factual contention of the defendant was not supported by any evidence.
87The third proceeding, Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] AATA 137, was an application by the defendant seeking review of a decision by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal that affirmed Centrelink's rejection of the defendant's application for a mobility allowance.
88The defendant's entitlement to a mobility allowance was dependant upon her satisfying the "travel test" under s 1035 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), being that the nature of her work required her to travel to and from that work (at [5]).
89The defendant's own evidence was that due to her health conditions she was conducting her voluntary work from her home (at [8]). The plaintiff submitted that this evidence was contrary to the legal case she was advancing.
90The AAT concluded that the defendant did not satisfy the "travel test" because "the nature of her voluntary work does not require her to travel to and from her home for the purpose of undertaking that work" (at [9]) and affirmed the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (at [12]).

Theme 6: unfounded allegations of denial of natural justice

91The plaintiff submitted that the defendant instituted three proceedings claiming that she had been denied natural justice where it was obvious or apparent that there was never such a denial. The plaintiff further submitted that the defendant took this course of action when she was dissatisfied with the merits of a decision against her.
92In the first proceeding, Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2007] FCAFC 24, the defendant attempted to appeal from a previous decision by Allsop J (as his Honour then was) in the Federal Court (Budd v Federal Privacy Commissioner [2006] FCA 1131 discussed above at [44]) in which his Honour concluded that the defendant's application for review of a decision by the Federal Privacy Commissioner "lacks any coherent basis for complaint" (at [2]).
93The defendant alleged that Allsop J failed to accord her natural justice by ignoring evidence that she had adduced in support of her case (at [4]-[8] and [15]). The Full Federal Court noted that Allsop J had referred to all of the defendant's evidence and that his Honour had found that there was nothing in the material that supported her case. Therefore, the allegation that she was denied natural justice was deemed to fail and the application was dismissed with costs.
94In the second proceeding, Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] FCA 1540, the defendant attempted to appeal from a previous decision by the AAT (Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] AATA 137 discussed above at [87]) in which the AAT affirmed the Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision to affirm Centrelink's decision rejecting the defendant's application for a mobility allowance.
95The defendant alleged that she had been denied natural justice and that the AAT failed to consider, or properly consider, a medical report upon which she relied (at [22] and [24]). The Federal Court concluded that that "there was no evidence to support Ms Budd's claim that there had been a denial of natural justice" (at [25]) and that the AAT did take into account her medical evidence and did not do anything improper in its consideration of it (at [24]). The Federal Court dismissed her application with costs.
96In the third proceedings, Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 1138, the defendant attempted to appeal from a decision by Emmett J in the Federal Court (Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 961 discussed above at [46] and [55]). In that decision Emmett J concluded that the defendant's application and subsequent amended application seeking review of a decision by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal to affirm Centrelink's rejection of the defendant's application for a "crisis payment" was incomprehensible and that "there is no prospect of the appeal succeeding" (at [20]).
97The defendant alleged that Emmett J had failed to accord her with procedural fairness because his Honour had not adjourned the matter long enough to allow the defendant to obtain legal representation (at [10]). The Federal Court found that "there is nothing in" that allegation (at [12]).
98The Federal Court held that the defendant had "conspicuously failed to identify any error on the part of [Emmett J]. All that she has done is to repeat her many complaints about the merits of the decision made by the Tribunal and the prior decision-makers" (at [21]) and dismissed the application.

Theme 7: inappropriate relief sought

99The plaintiff submitted that there were four proceedings in which the defendant sought unnecessary, pointless or plainly inappropriate relief.
100The first proceeding, NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2007] NSWADTAP 20, was an application to the Appeal Panel for leave to appeal against a decision of the ADT (Budd v State of NSW [2008] NSWADT 217, discussed above at [67]). The ADT had refused to revoke the appointment of a representative for the defendant in her dispute with the Department of Housing.
101Ms Ramjan had been appointed by the ADT to be the defendant's representative as it was satisfied that the defendant was an "incapacitated person" under s 71(4) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997. Ms Ramjan settled the case on the defendant's behalf and those proceedings were dismissed pursuant to a Deed of Settlement that was entered into by the parties.
102The application before the Appeal Panel took place after the settlement and after the dismissal of the proceedings against the Department of Housing. The plaintiff observed that the principal substantive reason that the defendant was not entitled to the relief sought was because there was no utility to the appeal. The underlying proceedings had been dismissed and the defendant had not appealed against the dismissal of the underlying proceedings (at [9]).
103The plaintiff submitted that in the next proceeding, NZ v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADT 35 (discussed above at [71]), the defendant sought inappropriate relief by turning to the ADT rather than first requesting that the agency in question, the Police, conduct an internal review of her FOI and privacy complaints.
104Similarly, in the third proceeding, Budd v New South Wales Commissioner of Police [2006] NSWSC 1265 (discussed above at [76]), the plaintiff submitted that the defendant sought inappropriate relief in her appeal against a decision of the Appeal Panel in relation to the FOI and privacy matter.
105The plaintiff pointed to the remarks of Bell J which noted that the defendant claimed relief in terms of compensation and costs (at [6]) and that such relief was plainly inappropriate given that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in that proceeding was limited to appeals on questions of law (at [19]).
106In the fourth proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2006] NSWSC 1266, the plaintiff submitted that the defendant sought inappropriate relief in her appeal against a decision by the ADT (Budd v State of NSW [2006] NSWADT 14 discussed above [58]) which refused permission for her to pursue two discrimination complaints that had been declined by the President of the ADB.
107The plaintiff claimed relief for compensation for medical and legal costs and damages for pain and suffering (at [6]).
108The defendant had previously sought leave to appeal to the Appeal Panel but that was not granted. Bell J noted that the Supreme Court only had jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Appeal Panel and not the ADT at first instance (at [10]). Her Honour also found that to the extent to which the defendant sought to appeal against the Tribunal's decision, it was thus misconceived (at [11]) and concluded that the proceedings were "manifestly hopeless" and dismissed them (at [21]).

Theme 8: inappropriate use of anti-discrimination legislation

109The plaintiff submitted that the defendant attempted to use anti-discrimination legislation to mount collateral attacks on other decisions or to express her unhappiness with decisions or actions that affected her.
110As to the first proceeding to the support this submission, Budd v State of NSW [2006] NSWADT 14 (referred to at [58] above), the plaintiff submitted that the defendant responded to the Police knocking on her door to investigate an alleged breach by her of an AVO by commencing proceedings under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977.
111The plaintiff argued that those proceedings were also in response to the Police's refusal to investigate an allegation of fraud against her sister in a long-running dispute that the defendant had with her about the distribution of assets after the death of their mother.
112As to the second proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2007] NSWADT 88 (discussed above at [63]), the plaintiff argued that the defendant brought proceedings against the Police alleging discrimination by refusing to serve an AVO as a way of responding to the Local Court's decision to refuse to issue the AVO.
113As to the third proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2007] NSWADT 112, the plaintiff argued that this was another response by the defendant to another refusal by the Local Court to issue an AVO. In this proceeding the plaintiff alleged that the Local Court, magistrates and court officers had discriminated against her on the grounds of disability.
114Those proceedings were dismissed after the ADT found that taking the defendant's case at its highest, it was "misconceived, lacking in substance and cannot succeed" (at [63]).
115As to the fourth proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2008] NSWADT 239 (discussed above at [52] and [66]), the plaintiff argued that the defendant commenced proceedings alleging discrimination against the ADT itself in response to the restrictions the ADT Registry had placed on her as to when she could communicate with it.
116As to the fifth proceeding, Budd v State of NSW [2009] NSWADT 217 (discussed above at [67] and [100]), the defendant claimed that the representative the ADT appointed to act for her in her dispute against the Department of Housing, Ms Ramjan, discriminated against her on the ground of disability. The plaintiff argued that these proceedings were commenced in response to the defendant's previous unsuccessful attempt to have Ms Ramjan removed as her representative.

Theme 9: proceedings against one entity in order to agitate a dispute with another entity

117The plaintiff argued that in one set of proceedings the defendant used or created a dispute with one entity in order to agitate a dispute with another entity, namely, the Department of Housing.
118In PLFX v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 464 (discussed above at [46] and [54]), the defendant sought a review of a decision by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal which affirmed Centrelink's decision rejecting her application for a "crisis payment".
119The defendant attempted to obtain the "crisis payment" after having sought to have her bathroom renovated by the Department of Housing which required her to move out. The Department had obtained hotel accommodation and provided travelling costs for her.
120The defendant applied for the payment on the basis that she had been required to leave her home because of "extreme circumstances". The AAT held that while the defendant had to move out of her home due to renovations, that did not amount to an "extreme circumstance" (at [16]) and affirmed the Social Security Appeal Tribunal's decision.
121In Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 961 (discussed above at [46], [55] and [96]) the defendant sought to appeal from the previous decision by the AAT. Emmett J concluded that both the defendant's Notice of Appeal and amended Notice of Appeal were "incomprehensible" (at [11]-[12] and [18]), that "there is no prospect of the appeal succeeding" (at [20]) and dismissed the proceedings with costs.
122In Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 1138, the defendant attempted to appeal from the previous decision by Emmett J. The Federal Court found that it was "far from satisfied that [the defendant] has any prospects of succeeding in any appeal that might be lodged were leave to be granted" (at [22]) and dismissed her application with costs.
123The plaintiff noted that the various decision makers observed that the defendant's complaints were part of her long-standing dispute with the Department of Housing. The plaintiff pointed to remarks by the AAT at [3]: "In summary, taking into account other answers to questions, the claim is a continuation of her ongoing dispute with [the Department of Housing]. She specified that the extreme circumstance she complained about was a rental crisis, that is living in conditions that she considers are unfit." Similarly, at [17], the AAT noted that "[the defendant's] complaint is really a longstanding one about her accommodation which is provided by [the Department of Housing]".

Theme 10: merits reviews where proceedings limited to questions of law only

124The plaintiff submitted that there were four proceedings in which the defendant sought merits reviews where the proceedings were limited to questions of law only. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant had been told that appeals to the Federal Court could only deal with errors of law and that it was not entitled to go and investigate the merits of decisions but continued to persist with those forms of applications.
125The first proceeding, Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] FCA 1540 (discussed above at [94]), was an attempt to appeal from a decision by the AAT which affirmed the Social Security Appeals Tribunal's decision to affirm Centrelink's refusal to grant the defendant a mobility allowance. The Federal Court found that the bases upon which the defendant challenged that finding only involved matters of fact (at [27]-[28]).
126The second proceeding, Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2009] FCA 345, was an attempt to appeal from the previous decision. The Federal Court held that the decision of the AAT sought to be challenged by the defendant "turned entirely on questions of fact" (at [16]). After considering the defendant's submissions, the Federal Court held that "none of the material... which was relied upon by Ms Budd in her oral submissions to me provides a foundation for a conclusion, or even a respectable argument, that the AAT committed an error of law" (at [39]).
127The third proceeding, Budd v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 961 (discussed above at [46], [96] and [121]), was an attempt to appeal a previous decision by the AAT affirming a decision by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal which had affirmed Centrelink's decision rejecting the defendant's application for a "crisis payment". The Federal Court held that the defendant's additional submissions served "only to confirm that [the defendant] is seeking to invite the Court to canvass the factual conclusions reached by the AA Tribunal" (at [19]).
128The fourth proceeding, Budd v Victims Compensation Corporation Fund [2009] NSWDC 35, was an application for leave to appeal to the District Court from a decision of the Victims Compensation Tribunal. The defendant had applied for compensation as a result of an alleged assault upon her by a neighbour. The primary decision-maker had concluded that the defendant had been assaulted but that she had not suffered the injuries that she claimed to have suffered (at [7]).
129The District Court refused leave to appeal because the asserted grounds were without merit (at [12]-[14]).
130The plaintiff observed that in just over five years the defendant had instituted 14 separate sets of proceedings and that these sets often involved one or more appeals or other applications. It was submitted that such a litigation history qualified as "frequent" institution or conducting of proceedings.
131The plaintiff submitted that the examination of the defendant's litigation history demonstrates that each of those 24 proceedings could properly be characterised as vexatious. Each of those proceedings was an abuse of process within the meaning of s 6(a) in that it was instituted or pursued without reasonable grounds within the meaning of s 6(c).
132The plaintiff further submitted that to the extent of the five proceedings in which the defendant filed "voluminous material", those proceedings were also vexatious in that the defendant conducted them in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment in doing so pursuant to s 6(d).
133The plaintiff submitted that it was relevant to consider that in eight proceedings a costs order was made against the defendant that she has not paid nor been relieved of the obligation to pay. The plaintiff pointed to remarks by Fullerton J in Croker where her Honour stated:
"I am satisfied that to cause others to incur legal costs in responding to hopeless applications, in circumstances where the defendant has blithely disregarded costs orders made against him is also an abuse of the courts' processes" (at [134]).

The Defendant's Submissions

134Mr Provera appeared for the defendant and made both written and oral submissions on her behalf.
135In his written submissions, Mr Provera addressed the litigation events that the defendant had been involved with and detailed specific facts and in some cases some observations.
136The submissions deal with the defendant's personal circumstances and her position of disadvantage in various respects, namely, her housing circumstances, health, income and lack of legal representation. Those circumstances are summarised below:

The defendant's unit

137The defendant has resided at a unit in South Coogee since about September 1984. The unit is rented from the NSW State Government housing authority ("Department of Housing").

The defendant's health

138Mr Provera pointed to the defendant's various mental health problems including agoraphobia, social anxiety disorder and panic attacks. He submitted that at all relevant times those problems affected her ability to leave her unit and interact with other people as well as commence and effectively maintain litigation.

The defendant's income

139Mr Provera further submitted that at all relevant times the defendant had limited income, no major assets and no real savings and was accordingly unable to afford private legal representation. He noted that she has been dependant upon a disability support pension since 1999.

Legal representation

140Mr Provera also submitted that the defendant received limited assistance from legal practitioners. The defendant prepared most of the documents, including initiating processes, forms and submissions in respect of the proceedings relied upon by the plaintiff as being vexatious.
141The submissions also include a number of points in relation to the various disputes that the defendant had with different entities however they are not developed in any analytical sense. Those points are summarised as follows:

Dispute with Ms Gardiner

142Ms Gardiner is a former neighbour of the defendant. A dispute arose between them as to the large amounts of items left in the common area adjacent to Ms Gardiner's unit. The defendant complained to the Department of Housing about the common area however no action was taken.
143The defendant obtained an AVO against Ms Gardiner requiring that Ms Gardiner not threaten, assault, harass or stalk the defendant. The AVO expired and the defendant unsuccessfully sought to apply for another AVO.
144The dispute between the neighbours and associated legal proceedings ended in 2006 when Ms Gardiner moved from those premises.

Matters involving NSW Police

145The Police attended the defendant's unit from time to time as a consequence of her dispute with Ms Gardiner. The Police visits caused the defendant stress and it was against this background that the defendant sought a remedy for the breach of her privacy.

Dispute with the Department of Housing

146The defendant complained to the Department about the need for renovation and repair work in the unit but no action was taken. As a result the defendant commenced legal action to obtain orders that the necessary renovation and repair work be undertaken. As a result of this action, an agreement was reached whereby the Department of Housing agreed, in part, to renovate and repair the bathroom of the defendant.
147In or about March 2006, Ms Ramjan was appointed as guardian for the defendant in respect of matters involving the Department of Housing before the ADT.
148The defendant did not agree to the appointment and accordingly sought to have Ms Ramjan removed from her role as guardian.
149Between about 16 and 24 June 2008, the Department of Housing renovated and repaired the defendant's bathroom.
150On 25 February 2010, the CTTT made an order requiring the Department of Housing to inspect the unit and to undertake further necessary repairs.

Matters involving Centrelink

151The defendant has been receiving benefits from Centrelink since 1984. Some time around 2005 or 2006, the defendant formed the belief that Centrelink had received incorrect information about her, namely about the amount of her assets. The defendant believed that this incorrect information had come in part from the Department of Housing.
152The defendant contacted Centrelink and requested it delete that incorrect information, or at least remove any mention of her name within such material. Centrelink refused that request.
153The defendant commenced legal action to obtain orders that Centrelink comply with that request.

Action against University of Sydney

154In 1993 and 1998, the defendant was awarded a Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts (Philosophy) respectively from the University of Sydney.
155The defendant regularly attended the University of Sydney for lectures, tutorials and the like in respect of both the above courses.
156In June 2008 the defendant applied to become a student in the Bachelor of Arts degree majoring in Biblical Studies. The defendant unsuccessfully sought a disability exemption from the attendance requirement. She subsequently commenced legal action to obtain orders that the University grant the request for a disability exemption.
157Mr Provera in oral submissions also addressed other matters which may be categorised as follows:

The requisite test

158Mr Provera submitted that the defendant's litigation history could not satisfy the requisite test under s 8 of the Act. In relation to the definition of "vexatious proceedings" under s 6(a), Mr Provera submitted that Goldberg J's discussion of "abuse of process" in White Industries (QLD) Pty Limited v Flower and Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169 outlined the principles to be applied in determining whether the proceedings had been such an abuse:
"the concept of 'abuse of process' in this context involves a party using court proceedings and procedures for a purpose unrelated to the objectives which the court process is designed to achieve" (at 239).
159In relation to the definition of "vexatious proceedings" under s 6(c), Mr Provera submitted that the court should take a broader view rather than a "legalistic view" when making its determination as to whether there had been reasonable grounds for the defendant's litigation. This broad view, it was submitted, should include a consideration of the motivation for the litigation.
160Mr Provera accepted that the assessment as to whether there were reasonable grounds must be an objective one rather than a subjective one however he submitted that such an assessment should not be limited to the specific nature and venue of the litigation that occurred. Mr Provera then submitted that the most significant cause of the defendant's failure in the proceedings was her inability to obtain legal representation, compounded by her restricted ability to leave her unit.
161In his oral submissions, Mr Provera referred to a number of discrete facts that related to some of the proceedings in question. He noted that there was a clear dispute about the state of common area near the defendant's unit with Ms Gardiner and that the dispute adversely affected the defendant's health. Similarly, Mr Provera noted that over the course of the dispute with the Department of Housing about the state of the defendant's unit, renovations for her bathroom had been arranged and the defendant was required to move out of her unit.
162It was submitted that the two disputes were not without foundation given that in February 2010 the CTTT had granted the defendant relief by ordering that the Department of Housing inspect her unit and undertake all necessary repairs.
163In relation to the defendant's dispute with the Police, Mr Provera noted that the issue that arose in the discrimination proceedings turned on whether the Police were providing a "service" in their various dealings with the defendant and noted that if the Police had been arresting her then that would have been regarded as providing a "service" and the Police would have had to take into account her disability.
164In relation to the proceedings where the defendant provided voluminous material, Mr Provera noted that such circumstances arise when the defendant, as a disadvantaged unrepresented litigant, was trying her best to provide appropriate documentation but was unable to do so.
165In submissions in reply, the plaintiff made the following points in relation to the requisite test to be applied. In making its determination, the Court's primary consideration is the objective prospects of success of the litigation in question rather than subjective factors such as the defendant's genuine reasons for commencing litigation and other mitigating factors.
166The plaintiff further submitted that the question is objective because the purpose of the jurisdiction is to protect the courts and members of the public from the annoyance, waste of time and resources that result from vexatious proceedings.
167As to the relevance of the principles outlined in White Industries, the plaintiff noted that that was an application against solicitors to pay the costs of proceedings commenced by their clients. The purpose of Goldberg J's discussion was to identify the circumstances in which a solicitor would incur a personal obligation to pay the costs of proceedings that were an abuse of process. The plaintiff made reference to his Honour's remarks where he detailed what constituted an abuse of process:
"The authorities do not support the proposition that simply instituting or maintaining a proceeding on behalf of a client which has no or substantially no prospect of success will invoke the jurisdiction. There must be something more namely, carrying on that conduct unreasonably" (at 236).
168The plaintiff noted that those additional factors were necessary to enliven the jurisdiction to make a solicitor liable for costs but they were not required for it to be an abuse of process on the part of a client.

Outstanding costs orders

169Mr Provera also made submissions in regards to the outstanding costs orders that have been made against the defendant. He submitted that there was a distinction to be made between a litigant who has the means to pay costs orders but fails to do so from an impoverished person who does not have the means. He referred to the affidavit of the defendant as evidence that she would be unlikely to ever meet the orders.
170The plaintiff accepted that the defendant was unable to pay the costs orders made against her. It was submitted, however, that it was a relevant factor that she had commenced litigation in circumstances where she had already incurred costs orders and with the knowledge that she was unable to meet any potential future costs orders.

Protection of the community

171Mr Provera accepted that the principal purpose of making an order under s 8 is not to punish a litigant but to protect the community. Mr Provera pointed to Davies J's decision in Gargan supra where reference was made to the judgment of Perram J:
"Secondly, the purpose of the order is not to impose condign punishment for past litigious misdeeds; it serves instead to shield both the public, whose individual members might be molested by vexatious proceedings, and the Court itself, whose limited resources and needs must be carefully managed and protected from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits." (at [8])
172Mr Provera submitted that the defendant had only been involved in three pieces of litigation since 2009, two which are the subject of these proceedings; Budd v Victims Compensation Corporation Fund [2009] NSWDC 35 and Budd v University of Sydney [2010] NSWADT 77, and one currently on foot in the District Court (which the plaintiff is not seeking to have stayed). In the first two proceedings, it was noted that no costs order was made against the defendant and no adverse comment was made as to the lack of reasonable prospects.
173In relation to the matter against the University of Sydney, Mr Provera also made submissions as to the utility of the defendant's claim. Mr Provera noted that the defendant had been legally represented. He submitted that the defendant had pursued what might be seen as a "legitimate right" and noted that there has been other litigation concerned with the alleged failure to provide a means of access for people with a disability.
174Mr Provera further submitted that there had been no evidence presented that indicated that the public at large needed to be protected at this time. He noted that the plaintiff's extensive searches had been unable to locate any other type of litigation instituted by the defendant aside from proceedings already identified. The defendant's disputes with the Department of Housing, the Police and Ms Gardiner had ceased and therefore, it was submitted, an order under s 8 would not achieve the principal purpose for which it was intended.
175In submissions in reply, the plaintiff again referred to Davies J in Gargan supra at [8] where his Honour made reference to Perram J's remarks:
"the factors which will be relevant are informed by the protective purpose which the order serves. Where a litigant displays insight into their previous litigious history this will, no doubt, be relevant for it will suggest - although not determine - a diminution in the risk posed to the public."
176The plaintiff submitted that the defendant's affidavit lacked "any insight into the inappropriateness of her prior litigious history". The plaintiff also pointed to a number of additional factors to support the proposition that despite a reduction in the defendant's litigious activity in the last few years an order under s 8 should still be made. Those factors can be summarised as follows:
(1)There has been no meaningful change in relation to the disabilities that she suffers which have been a substantial influence on both the fact of and manner in which she conducted her past litigation;
(2)The fact that there has only been three pieces of litigation instituted since 2009 is still a substantial amount of litigation and is still capable of satisfying the definition of "frequent";
(3)There is no reason to think that any future litigation on the part of the defendant will be conducted in any way different than in the past;
(4)The fact that the defendant's disputes with Ms Gardiner and the Police have ended does not change the fact the litigation by the defendant was not limited to those two entities and included various government departments;
(5)An order under s 8 does not preclude the defendant from commencing proper litigation; it simply requires that she obtain leave to do so before she is able to pursue it.

Voluminous material

177Mr Provera also addressed the plaintiff's claim that in having the tendency to subject the parties to voluminous material in five proceedings, the defendant had conducted those proceedings in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment pursuant to s 6(d).
178Mr Provera submitted that the applicable test under s 6(d) required a consideration of the subjective intention of the person involved in the conduct. This, it was submitted, required the Court to engage in the exercise of analysing each proceeding, reviewing the material served and making a determination as to whether the proceedings were conducted in the way envisaged by s 6(d).
179Mr Provera further submitted that it must be found that the person meant to cause delay or detriment, or achieve some other wrongful purpose for a conclusion that the proceedings were vexatious under s 6(d) and that there was nothing before the Court which would enable it to form such a view.
180In submissions in reply, the plaintiff submitted that a finding pursuant to s 6(d) did not involve considering the subjective intention on the part of the defendant and referred to Adamson J's remarks in Attorney General v Chan (2011) NSWSC 1315 where her Honour observed in relation to s 6:
"Furthermore, the difference between sub-paragraph (b), which connotes a subjective intention on the part of the Defendant, and subparagraph (d), which does not, and is concerned with effect and consequence, rather than motive or design, relieves the Court of the obligation of determining whether the respondent to such an application intends the consequences of his or her actions, or does not" (at [33]).

Conclusions

Were these vexatious proceedings?

181I accept the plaintiff's submissions that in examining the defendant's litigation history a number of themes emerge, principal among them being that the defendant instituted proceedings on the basis of unsubstantiated and at times unintelligible pleadings and upon being unsuccessful, continued to persist with her claims at various appellate levels despite the observations made by judicial and quasi judicial officers that they were baseless in dismissing them.
182In particular, I note the examples where the defendant sought to commence proceedings in tribunals and courts that lacked the jurisdiction to hear her claims; whether by reason of the relief she was seeking, the grounds of appeal she sought to advance or the prerequisites she had not yet fulfilled.
183Mr Provera drew attention to a range of matters by way of background to explain the defendant's litigation conduct, in particular, that the defendant struggled to obtain legal representation and suffered and continues to suffer from various disabilities.
184However, in determining whether the proceedings were vexatious pursuant to s 6, I accept the plaintiff's submission that the primary consideration for the Court is the objective prospects of success of the litigation in question rather than subjective factors.
185Previous decisions have enunciated the accepted principles and I note the plaintiff's reference to the remarks of Davies J in Gargan supra at [8] where his Honour cited the remarks of Perram J:
"[E]ach of these notions - the want of reasonable grounds, habitual institution and persistent institution - are to be gauged objectively. But this does not mean that a litigant's own protestation as to his or her own mental state is irrelevant; frequently enough, the vexatious are betrayed out of their own mouths. Rather, the need for objective determination protects courts from the vexatious litigant who is genuinely, but misguidedly, persuaded as to the correctness of his or her own conduct."
186I am satisfied that the defendant has instituted or conducted proceedings that are vexatious within the meaning of s 6 of the Act, whether they be proceedings brought without reasonable grounds or proceedings that are otherwise an abuse of court processes.
187That conclusion is reached without having to take into account the submissions made by the plaintiff that the defendant had a tendency to subject the parties in court to voluminous material in five particular proceedings.

Were they instituted or conducted frequently?

188In a period of about five and a half years, the defendant instituted 25 proceedings in various tribunals and courts, 24 of which were commenced without reasonable grounds and/or were otherwise an abuse of process. Several of those proceedings involved attempts to re-litigate matters that had been dismissed as hopeless or baseless.
189Taking into account all the circumstances and the context of the whole litigation history I am satisfied that the proceedings the defendant instituted have been instituted "frequently". I refer on the remarks of Davies J in Wilson supra at [126]:
"When it is considered that the majority of individuals in our community would never institute legal proceedings, and those that do would ordinarily have a need to do so once or twice in their lives, commencing 14 separate Supreme Court actions in 11 years can be said to be the institution of proceedings "frequently".

Should an order be made?

190I accept the submission by both parties that the primary purpose of an order pursuant to s 8 is to protect the courts and members of the public from the expense, burden and inconvenience of vexatious proceedings.
191The multiplicity of proceedings and the reasons upon which they were found to be baseless as established in this case provides strong grounds for making an order pursuant to s 8 in order to fulfil that protective function.
192I accept the plaintiff's submission that it is relevant to consider the fact that the defendant had commenced proceedings with the knowledge that there were outstanding costs orders against her and that, on the material in evidence, she will be unable to fulfil any future costs orders. There was no evidence put by the defendant that she was endeavouring to finalise outstanding costs orders.
193The defendant has limited income and it therefore appears that the likelihood of her being able to pay any further costs orders made against her is remote.
194I also accept the plaintiff's submission that a demonstration of the defendant's insight into her litigation history is a relevant matter in determining whether to exercise the discretion under s 8. While her affidavit outlines a number of points in order to provide explanation for her behaviour, the defendant has not shown that she recognises that in 24 proceedings she instituted, she never had proper grounds for her claims as made in those proceedings.
195While I acknowledge that there has been a decrease in the defendant's litigious activity since 2009, I accept the plaintiff's submissions that there are a number of factors which indicate that an order under s 8 should be made. Those include the fact that the defendant has suffered and continues to suffer from disabilities which have had a substantial influence on her conduct in litigation, the fact that there is little indication by the defendant herself that she would conduct future litigation in a different way to the past and that an order under s 8 does not preclude her from commencing, with the leave of the Court, proper litigation.
196In arriving at this conclusion, I have had close regard to the report of Mr McKell dated 10 April 2013 (Exhibit "A4" in the present proceedings).
197In particular, I have noted Mr McKell's observations to the fact of some improvement in the defendant's condition and to the matters stated in the report (at pp 4-5). I, however, do not consider that the matters to which he refers can provide the necessary assurance against further vexatious proceedings by the defendant particularly in the absence of any direct and cogent evidence from her on that issue.
198I recognise that making a vexatious proceedings order significantly curtails the defendant's ability to access the courts and tribunals, however, for the reasons set out above, I conclude that in the circumstances it is appropriate and necessary to make such an order.
199As to the question of costs, it would seem that the costs follow the event rule should apply (unless the defendant wishes to contest the issue of costs by written application within 14 days of this Judgment).
200Accordingly, I make the following orders:
(1)Pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, Pamela Joan Theresa Budd is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales other than with leave of an appropriate court under that Act
(2)The defendant is to pay the plaintiff's costs on the ordinary basis.
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Application for Order Under the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010

201Earlier this year, following notification to the parties of the date for delivery of judgment, the defendant, Ms Budd, through my Associate, gave verbal notice that she wished to have her identity suppressed in relation to the judgment to be delivered and orders made in the proceedings.
202The application was, in effect, for an order under the abovementioned Act ("the Court Suppression Act").
203The delivery of judgment was deferred in order to provide the defendant with an opportunity to put before the Court any material that she wished to rely upon in support of her application for an order suppressing her identity.
204Subsequently the defendant relied upon a significant volume of material which became Exhibits A1, A2 and A3 on the application. Included in the material were a number of medical reports and letters from as early as September 2002 prepared by various medical practitioners in relation to the defendant's housing issues. The material also included several letters from community members who had known the defendant in particular in relation to her housing issues.
205On 5 March 2013, I gave directions in relation to the defendant's application including a direction for submissions to be lodged in accordance with the timetable set out in the directions.
206Written submissions were received on behalf of the Attorney General dated 28 March 2013. When the proceedings were listed on 5 April 2013 the defendant was provided with an opportunity of addressing the Court by telephone link, she apparently, being unable to attend court.
207Under s 3 of the Court Suppression Act, a "non-publication order" is defined as meaning an order that prohibits or restricts the publication of information and provides, "but that does not otherwise prohibit or restrict the disclosure of information". The expression "suppression order" means an order that prohibits or restricts the disclosure of information (by publication or otherwise).
208The Court's power under the Act to make orders was considered by the Court of Appeal in Rinehart v Welker [2011] NSWCA 403. As noted in the decision in that case, the inherent power at common law of the Court to uphold the integrity of the Court process is preserved.
209Under s 6 of the Act, the Court is required in deciding whether to make an order to take into account the fact that a primary objective is the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice.
210The power to make orders under the Court Suppression Act are to be found in ss 7 and 8 of the Act.
211Section 7 provides:
"A court may, by making a suppression order or non-publication order on grounds permitted by this Act, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of:
(a) information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in proceedings before the court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in proceedings before the court, or
(b) information that comprises evidence, or information about evidence, given in proceedings before the court."
212Section 8 provides:
"(1) A court may make a suppression order or non-publication order on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice,
(b) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the interests of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to national or international security,
(c) the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person,
(d) the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in criminal proceedings involving an offence of a sexual nature (including an act of indecency),
(e) it is otherwise necessary in the public interest for the order to be made and that public interest significantly outweighs the public interest in open justice.
(2) A suppression order or non-publication order must specify the ground or grounds on which the order is made."
213It is clear that the onus of satisfying the Court that such an order should be made rests upon the party seeking the order. This has also been the position under the general law.
214In relation to the bundles of materials sent by the defendant to my Associate between 5 and 15 March 2013, there were two matters raised on behalf of the Attorney General in relation to them. First they contain no contention as to the legal principles to be applied in an application for an order under the Court Suppression Act or under the general law. Secondly, the emails contained matters that went well beyond the permissible scope of submissions permitted under the directions that had been given.
215As observed in the written submissions for the Attorney General at [20], the thrust of the defendant's contentions appears to be, if her name were to be published in either the title of the case, the body of the judgment or in formal orders, her reputation would be adversely affected. Second, the contention that if she were identified in the name of the case, or in the reasons or formal orders then this may in some way adversely affect her physical and/or psychological wellbeing.
216These contentions were reiterated by the defendant in the various materials she sent to my Associate between 16 March 2013 and 11 April 2013, now exhibits on the application (Exhibits A1, A2 and A3). As submitted by the Attorney General in relation to earlier material, this subsequent material also raised matters that went beyond the scope of submissions permitted under the relevant directions in that it sought to raise issues in relation to the substantive application by the Attorney General.
217It was observed that as at the date of the written submissions for the Attorney General no expert evidence had been provided to substantiate or support the contention that the identification of the defendant's name in the case name, reasons or formal orders, would lead to any form of physical and/or psychological illness.
218However, following the last hearing date, there was provided to my Associate a copy of a report by a psychologist, Mr Grant McKell, dated 10 April 2013, which I have since marked as Exhibit A4.
219In Mr McKell's report there were a number of matters raised including the following:
(i) His initial contact with the defendant was by telephone on 4 April 2013. Arrangements were made to meet her at her residence on 9 April 2013.
(ii) The report contained a detailed account of what was termed "Relevant Background Information". This included a number of reports from various health and mental health practitioners. Those reports were said to refer to the defendant's behaviours that were consistent with agoraphobia and social anxiety and were said to be within the severe range.
220In the assessment of "current functioning" Mr McKell observed that the defendant expressed great concern about her name being publicly listed in any findings that the Court may determine arising from the present proceedings.
221Mr McKell expressed his agreement with his colleagues and other medical personnel that the defendant continued to present with what he termed Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia (DSM-IVTR 300.21) and Social Phobia (DSM-IV-TR 300.23). He observed that it was clear that the defendant was extremely anxious about the outcome of the present proceedings, in particular about her name being listed publicly as a vexatious litigant. He expressed the view that if that outcome was realised:
"... it would present a real and enduring obstacle to Ms Budd's prognosis and her ability to engage fruitfully with therapy to bring about improvement in her life and to once again become an active and contributing member of the community." (Report p 4)
222In his report, Mr McKell included a "Recommendation" that the defendant's name be suppressed in any findings under s 8(1)(c) of the Court Suppression Act as it is necessary to protect her safety in terms of her mental health.
223He put forward a number of matters which he considered were in the public interest in terms of preserving the defendant's capacity and opportunity to recover from what he described as her "mental illness".
224It is important, in relation to the application for a suppression order to take into account both the statutory scheme and the orders permitted to be made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008.
225The Court may make an order under s 8 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act if the Court is satisfied of the matters specified in s 8(1).
226The court under s 17 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act has specified powers for limiting disclosure of specific matters referred to in that section. Those provisions, however, are not relevant to the present application.
227In the written submissions of the Attorney General it was submitted that the legislative provisions give voice to a policy to the effect that the making of a vexatious proceedings order is to be attended by a certain degree of publicity: at [29].
228The reasons for the publicity, it was submitted, are to be found in the relevant provisions of the Vexatious Proceedings Act including in particular ss 6 and 8 and the provisions of Part 3 of the Act.
229The provisions for publication of orders under s 8(1) to which I have earlier referred are designed for protective purposes, namely, that vexatious proceedings orders are made to protect the scarce judicial resources of the State from abuse, as well as protecting those who may be involved in vexatious litigation in which another participant conducts him or herself vexatiously: Attorney General's Written Submissions at [31].
230The submission for the Attorney General was that given the nature of the present proceedings, there is no basis upon which such an order can be made under the Court Suppression Act. I accept that submission.
231It is clear that under s 11, there is a regime whereby, inter alia, a vexatious proceedings order (a "notifiable order") is dealt with, in particular by the appropriate Registrar of an authorised Court arranging for a copy of the orders to be published in the Gazette within 14 days after the order is made and having it recorded in a publicly available register kept for the purposes of the Act: s 11(2). In other words, public notification of an order is necessarily a part of the statutory scheme.
232I have taken into account the material relied upon by the defendant in support of the application made to suppress her identity, in particular, the report of Mr McKell to which I have referred. The position at law, however, is that there is no power to grant the relief sought unless an order is "necessary" in the particular respects specified in s 8(1) of the Court Suppression Act. I do not consider that s 8(1)(c) is available. There is no issue of "safety" in the present case as that term is employed in the sub-section. The evidence in any event does not support a suppression order.
233I do not consider that the circumstances relied upon by the defendant in support of the application for such an order could be classed as exceptional circumstances that would outweigh the public interest in the proper administration of justice or as falling within s 8(1). There is a strong public interest that the legislative scheme established under the Vexatious Proceedings Act, including the regime for notification of vexatious proceedings orders in s 11 of that Act be given effect.
234Accordingly, the application for suppression of the defendant's identity in the judgment or orders made is refused.

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Schedule



DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
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