Thursday 28 November 2013

Jane Brockington CEO VCGLR/ Adam Toma/ Veronique Ingram

 In light of systemic corrupt conduct and corruption in Government Departments and the responsibility of Agency Heads and CEO'S of Government Departments there is a responsibility to adaquately investigate these complaints.
At the Insolvency Trustee Service Australia or now called Australia Financial Security Service Australia the Inspector General Veronique Ingram failed in everyway to put a halt to these practices.
Clearly this  Commonwealth Department would not have been able to function without these corrupt practices.
The shonky Principal Legal Officer  Matthew Osborne is advising the Official Trustee and Private trustees  and giving corrupt Legal advice.
Complaints made to Bankruptcy Regulations are also  being fucked over because of this Legal Advice.
 The Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Australian Public Service Commission are also protecting the systemic  corrupt conduct and corruption at AFSA or ITSA.
So what was the conversation Jane Brockinton CEO VCGLR had with the corrupt Adam Toma when he first came to work at the VCGLR from AFSA?
It appears we will all find out in my court case when Adam Toma is cross examined!!!!
 


Monday 25 November 2013

             (1)  A fault element for a particular physical element may be intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence.
             (2)  Subsection (1) does not prevent a law that creates a particular offence from specifying other fault elements for a physical element of that offence.
             (1)  A person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in that conduct.
             (2)  A person has intention with respect to a circumstance if he or she believes that it exists or will exist.
             (3)  A person has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
                   A person has knowledge of a circumstance or a result if he or she is aware that it exists or will exist in the ordinary course of events.
             (1)  A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance if:
                     (a)  he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists or will exist; and
                     (b)  having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.
             (2)  A person is reckless with respect to a result if:
                     (a)  he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur; and
                     (b)  having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.
             (3)  The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable is one of fact.
             (4)  If recklessness is  a fault element for a physical element of an offence, proof of intention, knowledge or recklessness will satisfy that fault element.
                   A person is negligent with respect to a physical element of an offence if his or her conduct involves:
                     (a)  such a great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the circumstances; and
                     (b)  such a high risk that the physical element exists or will exist;
that the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence.
             (1)  If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists only of conduct, intention is the fault element for that physical element.
             (2)  If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists of a circumstance or a result, recklessness is the fault element for that physical element.
Note:          Under subsection 5.4(4), recklessness can be established by proving intention, knowledge or recklessness.

474.17 Using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:

(a) the person uses a carriage service; and

(b) the person does so in a way (whether by the method of use or

the content of a communication, or both) that reasonable

persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances,

menacing, harassing or offensive.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years

It should be noted that it is a requirement that in all circumstances that a reasonable person would find it offensive. Clearly the Australian Federal Police find that in all cicumstances that systemic corrupt conduct should be protected



473.4 Determining whether material is offensive


The matters to be taken into account in deciding for the purposes of


this Part whether reasonable persons would regard particular


material, or a particular use of a carriage service, as being, in all


the circumstances, offensive, include:


(a) the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally


accepted by reasonable adults; and


(b) the literary, artistic or educational merit (if any) of the


material; and


(c) the general character of the material (including whether it is


of a medical, legal or scientific character
Also to obtain a guilty verdict the CDPP and the AFP who have been asked by Veronique Ingram to protect systemic corrupt conduct must satisfy intent as outlined in the schedule

CRIMINAL CODE ACT 1995 - SCHEDULE The

Criminal Code











The only offences against laws of the Commonwealth are those offences created by, or under the authority of, this Code or any other Act.


Note: Under subsection 38(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 , Act means an Act passed by the Parliament of the Commonwealth.










The purpose of this Chapter is to codify the general principles of criminal responsibility under laws of the Commonwealth. It contains all the general principles of criminal responsibility that apply to any offence, irrespective of how the offence is created.




(1) This Chapter applies to all offences against this Code.


(2) Subject to section 2.3, this Chapter applies on and after 15 December 2001 to all other offences.


(3) Section 11.6 applies to all offences.




Subsections 4.2(6) and (7) and Division 8 apply to all offences. For the purpose of interpreting those provisions in connection with an offence, the other provisions of this Chapter may be considered, whether or not those other provisions apply to the offence concerned.








(1) An offence consists of physical elements and fault elements.


(2) However, the law that creates the offence may provide that there is no fault element for one or more physical elements.


(3) The law that creates the offence may provide different fault elements for different physical elements.




In order for a person to be found guilty of committing an offence the following must be proved:


(a) the existence of such physical elements as are, under the law creating the offence, relevant to establishing guilt;


(b) in respect of each such physical element for which a fault element is required, one of the fault elements for the physical element.


Note 1: See Part 2.6 on proof of criminal responsibility.


Note 2: See Part 2.7 on geographical jurisdiction.






(1) A physical element of an offence may be:


(a) conduct; or


(b) a result of conduct; or


(c) a circumstance in which conduct, or a result of conduct, occurs.


(2) In this Code:


"conduct" means an act, an omission to perform an act or a state of affairs.


"engage in conduct" means:


(a) do an act; or


(b) omit to perform an act.




(1) Conduct can only be a physical element if it is voluntary.


(2) Conduct is only voluntary if it is a product of the will of the person whose conduct it is.


(3) The following are examples of conduct that is not voluntary:


(a) a spasm, convulsion or other unwilled bodily movement;


(b) an act performed during sleep or unconsciousness;


(c) an act performed during impaired consciousness depriving the person of the will to act.


(4) An omission to perform an act is only voluntary if the act omitted is one which the person is capable of performing.


(5) If the conduct constituting an offence consists only of a state of affairs, the state of affairs is only voluntary if it is one over which the person is capable of exercising control.


(6) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether conduct is voluntary.


(7) Intoxication is self-induced unless it came about:


(a) involuntarily; or


(b) as a result of fraud, sudden or extraordinary emergency, accident, reasonable mistake, duress or force.




An omission to perform an act can only be a physical element if:


(a) the law creating the offence makes it so; or


(b) the law creating the offence impliedly provides that the offence is committed by an omission to perform an act that there is a duty to perform by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or at common law.






(1) A fault element for a particular physical element may be intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence.


(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent a law that creates a particular offence from specifying other fault elements for a physical element of that offence.




(1) A person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in that conduct.


(2) A person has intention with respect to a circumstance if he or she believes that it exists or will exist.


(3) A person has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.




A person has knowledge of a circumstance or a result if he or she is aware that it exists or will exist in the ordinary course of events.




(1) A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance if:


(a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists or will exist; and


(b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.


(2) A person is reckless with respect to a result if:


(a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur; and


(b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.


(3) The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable is one of fact.


(4) If recklessness is a fault element for a physical element of an offence, proof of intention, knowledge or recklessness will satisfy that fault element.




A person is negligent with respect to a physical element of an offence if his or her conduct involves:


(a) such a great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the circumstances; and


(b) such a high risk that the physical element exists or will exist;


that the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence.




(1) If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists only of conduct, intention is the fault element for that physical element.


(2) If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists of a circumstance or a result, recklessness is the fault element for that physical element.


Note: Under subsection 5.4(4), recklessness can be established by proving intention, knowledge or recklessness.






(1) If a law that creates an offence provides that the offence is an offence of strict liability:


(a) there are no fault elements for any of the physical elements of the offence; and


(b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available.


(2) If a law that creates an offence provides that strict liability applies to a particular physical element of the offence:


(a) there are no fault elements for that physical element; and


(b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available in relation to that physical element.


(3) The existence of strict liability does not make any other defence unavailable.




(1) If a law that creates an offence provides that the offence is an offence of absolute liability:


(a) there are no fault elements for any of the physical elements of the offence; and


(b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is unavailable.


(2) If a law that creates an offence provides that absolute liability applies to a particular physical element of the offence:


(a) there are no fault elements for that physical element; and


(b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is unavailable in relation to that physical element.


(3) The existence of absolute liability does not make any other defence unavailable.




Note: This Part sets out defences that are generally available. Defences that apply to a more limited class of offences are dealt with elsewhere in this Code and in other laws.






A child under 10 years old is not criminally responsible for an offence.




(1) A child aged 10 years or more but under 14 years old can only be criminally responsible for an offence if the child knows that his or her conduct is wrong.


(2) The question whether a child knows that his or her conduct is wrong is one of fact. The burden of proving this is on the prosecution.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if, at the time of carrying out the conduct constituting the offence, the person was suffering from a mental impairment that had the effect that:


(a) the person did not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or


(b) the person did not know that the conduct was wrong (that is, the person could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether the conduct, as perceived by reasonable people, was wrong); or


(c) the person was unable to control the conduct.


(2) The question whether the person was suffering from a mental impairment is one of fact.


(3) A person is presumed not to have been suffering from such a mental impairment. The presumption is only displaced if it is proved on the balance of probabilities (by the prosecution or the defence) that the person was suffering from such a mental impairment.


(4) The prosecution can only rely on this section if the court gives leave.


(5) The tribunal of fact must return a special verdict that a person is not guilty of an offence because of mental impairment if and only if it is satisfied that the person is not criminally responsible for the offence only because of a mental impairment.


(6) A person cannot rely on a mental impairment to deny voluntariness or the existence of a fault element but may rely on this section to deny criminal responsibility.


(7) If the tribunal of fact is satisfied that a person carried out conduct as a result of a delusion caused by a mental impairment, the delusion cannot otherwise be relied on as a defence.


(8) In this Code:


"mental impairment" includes senility, intellectual disability, mental illness, brain damage and severe personality disorder.


(9) The reference in subsection (8) to mental illness is a reference to an underlying pathological infirmity of the mind, whether of long or short duration and whether permanent or temporary, but does not include a condition that results from the reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary external stimuli. However, such a condition may be evidence of a mental illness if it involves some abnormality and is prone to recur.






For the purposes of this Division, intoxication is self-induced unless it came about:


(a) involuntarily; or


(b) as a result of fraud, sudden or extraordinary emergency, accident, reasonable mistake, duress or force.




(1) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether a fault element of basic intent existed.


(2) A fault element of basic intent is a fault element of intention for a physical element that consists only of conduct.


Note: A fault element of intention with respect to a circumstance or with respect to a result is not a fault element of basic intent.


(3) This section does not prevent evidence of self-induced intoxication being taken into consideration in determining whether conduct was accidental.


(4) This section does not prevent evidence of self-induced intoxication being taken into consideration in determining whether a person had a mistaken belief about facts if the person had considered whether or not the facts existed.


(5) A person may be regarded as having considered whether or not facts existed if:


(a) he or she had considered, on a previous occasion, whether those facts existed in circumstances surrounding that occasion; and


(b) he or she honestly and reasonably believed that the circumstances surrounding the present occasion were the same, or substantially the same, as those surrounding the previous occasion.




(1) If negligence is a fault element for a particular physical element of an offence, in determining whether that fault element existed in relation to a person who is intoxicated, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated.


(2) However, if intoxication is not self-induced, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable person intoxicated to the same extent as the person concerned.




(1) If any part of a defence is based on actual knowledge or belief, evidence of intoxication may be considered in determining whether that knowledge or belief existed.


(2) If any part of a defence is based on reasonable belief, in determining whether that reasonable belief existed, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated.


(3) If a person's intoxication is not self-induced, in determining whether any part of a defence based on reasonable belief exists, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable person intoxicated to the same extent as the person concerned.


(4) If, in relation to an offence:


(a) each physical element has a fault element of basic intent; and


(b) any part of a defence is based on actual knowledge or belief;


evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether that knowledge or belief existed.


(5) A fault element of basic intent is a fault element of intention for a physical element that consists only of conduct.


Note: A fault element of intention with respect to a circumstance or with respect to a result is not a fault element of basic intent.




A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person's conduct constituting the offence was as a result of intoxication that was not self-induced.






(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element for which there is a fault element other than negligence if:


(a) at the time of the conduct constituting the physical element, the person is under a mistaken belief about, or is ignorant of, facts; and


(b) the existence of that mistaken belief or ignorance negates any fault element applying to that physical element.


(2) In determining whether a person was under a mistaken belief about, or was ignorant of, facts, the tribunal of fact may consider whether the mistaken belief or ignorance was reasonable in the circumstances.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element for which there is no fault element if:


(a) at or before the time of the conduct constituting the physical element, the person considered whether or not facts existed, and is under a mistaken but reasonable belief about those facts; and


(b) had those facts existed, the conduct would not have constituted an offence.


(2) A person may be regarded as having considered whether or not facts existed if:


(a) he or she had considered, on a previous occasion, whether those facts existed in the circumstances surrounding that occasion; and


(b) he or she honestly and reasonably believed that the circumstances surrounding the present occasion were the same, or substantially the same, as those surrounding the previous occasion.


Note: Section 6.2 prevents this section applying in situations of absolute liability.




(1) A person can be criminally responsible for an offence even if, at the time of the conduct constituting the offence, he or she is mistaken about, or ignorant of, the existence or content of an Act that directly or indirectly creates the offence or directly or indirectly affects the scope or operation of the offence.


(2) Subsection (1) does not apply, and the person is not criminally responsible for the offence in those circumstances, if the Act is expressly to the contrary effect.




(1) A person can be criminally responsible for an offence even if, at the time of the conduct constituting the offence, he or she is mistaken about, or ignorant of, the existence or content of the subordinate legislation that directly or indirectly creates the offence or directly or indirectly affects the scope or operation of the offence.


(2) Subsection (1) does not apply, and the person is not criminally responsible for the offence in those circumstances, if:


(a) the subordinate legislation is expressly to the contrary effect; or


(c) at the time of the conduct, the subordinate legislation:


(i) has not been made available to the public (by means of the Register under the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 or otherwise); and


(ii) has not otherwise been made available to persons likely to be affected by it in such a way that the person would have become aware of its contents by exercising due diligence.


(3) In this section:


"available" includes available by sale.


"subordinate legislation" means an instrument of a legislative character made directly or indirectly under an Act, or in force directly or indirectly under an Act.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element relating to property if:


(a) at the time of the conduct constituting the offence, the person is under a mistaken belief about a proprietary or possessory right; and


(b) the existence of that right would negate a fault element for any physical element of the offence.


(2) A person is not criminally responsible for any other offence arising necessarily out of the exercise of the proprietary or possessory right that he or she mistakenly believes to exist.


(3) This section does not negate criminal responsibility for an offence relating to the use of force against a person.






A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element to which absolute liability or strict liability applies if:


(a) the physical element is brought about by another person over whom the person has no control or by a non-human act or event over which the person has no control; and


(b) the person could not reasonably be expected to guard against the bringing about of that physical element.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if he or she carries out the conduct constituting the offence under duress.


(2) A person carries out conduct under duress if and only if he or she reasonably believes that:


(a) a threat has been made that will be carried out unless an offence is committed; and


(b) there is no reasonable way that the threat can be rendered ineffective; and


(c) the conduct is a reasonable response to the threat.


(3) This section does not apply if the threat is made by or on behalf of a person with whom the person under duress is voluntarily associating for the purpose of carrying out conduct of the kind actually carried out.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if he or she carries out the conduct constituting the offence in response to circumstances of sudden or extraordinary emergency.


(2) This section applies if and only if the person carrying out the conduct reasonably believes that:


(a) circumstances of sudden or extraordinary emergency exist; and


(b) committing the offence is the only reasonable way to deal with the emergency; and


(c) the conduct is a reasonable response to the emergency.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if he or she carries out the conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.


(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if he or she believes the conduct is necessary:


(a) to defend himself or herself or another person; or


(b) to prevent or terminate the unlawful imprisonment of himself or herself or another person; or


(c) to protect property from unlawful appropriation, destruction, damage or interference; or


(d) to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises; or


(e) to remove from any land or premises a person who is committing criminal trespass;


and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives them.


(3) This section does not apply if the person uses force that involves the intentional infliction of death or really serious injury:


(a) to protect property; or


(b) to prevent criminal trespass; or


(c) to remove a person who is committing criminal trespass.


(4) This section does not apply if:


(a) the person is responding to lawful conduct; and


(b) he or she knew that the conduct was lawful.


However, conduct is not lawful merely because the person carrying it out is not criminally responsible for it.




A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the conduct constituting the offence is justified or excused by or under a law.








(1) A person who attempts to commit an offence is guilty of the offence of attempting to commit that offence and is punishable as if the offence attempted had been committed.


(2) For the person to be guilty, the person's conduct must be more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence. The question whether conduct is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence is one of fact.


(3) For the offence of attempting to commit an offence, intention and knowledge are fault elements in relation to each physical element of the offence attempted.


Note: Under section 3.2, only one of the fault elements of intention or knowledge would need to be established in respect of each physical element of the offence attempted.


(3A) Subsection (3) has effect subject to subsection (6A).


(4) A person may be found guilty even if:


(a) committing the offence attempted is impossible; or


(b) the person actually committed the offence attempted.


(5) A person who is found guilty of attempting to commit an offence cannot be subsequently charged with the completed offence.


(6) Any defences, procedures, limitations or qualifying provisions that apply to an offence apply also to the offence of attempting to commit that offence.


(6A) Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply also to the offence of attempting to commit that offence.


(7) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against section 11.2 (complicity and common purpose), section 11.2A (joint commission), section 11.3 (commission by proxy), section 11.5 (conspiracy to commit an offence) or section 135.4 (conspiracy to defraud).




(1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by another person is taken to have committed that offence and is punishable accordingly.


(2) For the person to be guilty:


(a) the person's conduct must have in fact aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of the offence by the other person; and


(b) the offence must have been committed by the other person.


(3) For the person to be guilty, the person must have intended that:


(a) his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any offence (including its fault elements) of the type the other person committed; or


(b) his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence and have been reckless about the commission of the offence (including its fault elements) that the other person in fact committed.


(3A) Subsection (3) has effect subject to subsection (6).


(4) A person cannot be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence if, before the offence was committed, the person:


(a) terminated his or her involvement; and


(b) took all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the offence.


(5) A person may be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence even if the other person has not been prosecuted or has not been found guilty.


(6) Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply also for the purposes of determining whether a person is guilty of that offence because of the operation of subsection (1).


(7) If the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person either:


(a) is guilty of a particular offence otherwise than because of the operation of subsection (1); or


(b) is guilty of that offence because of the operation of subsection (1);


but is not able to determine which, the trier of fact may nonetheless find the person guilty of that offence.




Joint commission


(1) If:


(a) a person and at least one other party enter into an agreement to commit an offence; and


(b) either:


(i) an offence is committed in accordance with the agreement (within the meaning of subsection (2)); or


(ii) an offence is committed in the course of carrying out the agreement (within the meaning of subsection (3));


the person is taken to have committed the joint offence referred to in whichever of subsection (2) or (3) applies and is punishable accordingly.


Offence committed in accordance with the agreement


(2) An offence is committed in accordance with the agreement if:


(a) the conduct of one or more parties in accordance with the agreement makes up the physical elements consisting of conduct of an offence (the joint offence ) of the same type as the offence agreed to; and


(b) to the extent that a physical element of the joint offence consists of a result of conduct--that result arises from the conduct engaged in; and


(c) to the extent that a physical element of the joint offence consists of a circumstance--the conduct engaged in, or a result of the conduct engaged in, occurs in that circumstance.


Offence committed in the course of carrying out the agreement


(3) An offence is committed in the course of carrying out the agreement if the person is reckless about the commission of an offence (the joint offence ) that another party in fact commits in the course of carrying out the agreement.


Intention to commit an offence


(4) For a person to be guilty of an offence because of the operation of this section, the person and at least one other party to the agreement must have intended that an offence would be committed under the agreement.


Agreement may be non-verbal etc.


(5) The agreement:


(a) may consist of a non-verbal understanding; and


(b) may be entered into before, or at the same time as, the conduct constituting any of the physical elements of the joint offence was engaged in.


Termination of involvement etc.


(6) A person cannot be found guilty of an offence because of the operation of this section if, before the conduct constituting any of the physical elements of the joint offence concerned was engaged in, the person:


(a) terminated his or her involvement; and


(b) took all reasonable steps to prevent that conduct from being engaged in.


Person may be found guilty even if another party not prosecuted etc.


(7) A person may be found guilty of an offence because of the operation of this section even if:


(a) another party to the agreement has not been prosecuted or has not been found guilty; or


(b) the person was not present when any of the conduct constituting the physical elements of the joint offence was engaged in.


Special liability provisions apply


(8) Any special liability provisions that apply to the joint offence apply also for the purposes of determining whether a person is guilty of that offence because of the operation of this section.



So it appears that Jane Brockington CEO of VCGLR questioned Adam Toma on his exposure on the internet of his participation of systemic corrupt conduct and corruption at ITSA.


So it appears that Jane Brockington CEO of VCGLR questioned Adam Toma on his exposure on the internet of his participation of systemic corrupt conduct and corruption at ITSA.

However she then made the decision not to make further inquires into this matter.

Was Brockington’s decision based purely on the fact that she herself protected systemic corrupt conduct at the VCGLR and she considered it to be beneficial to have an employee that agreed with her?

It will be interesting in court when Adam Toma is questioned in depth about this conversation  with Brockington and will Toma's evidence help bring down the VCGLR.

 
Veronique Ingram / AFSA/to appear in court
It appears Veronique Ingram/ Inspector General in Bankruptcy is really pissed off somebody has failed to be intimidated by the threats of senior management at ITSA/ AFSA and has exposed the total mismanagement and systemically corrupt system for which she is responsible for.
Veronique is also totally pissed that she believe she has been placed a compromising position in the view of the public.
So it is particularly funny now that Veronique Ingram is to appear in court and try to express how her reputation has been tarnished and how I have attempted to destroy her professional image by exposing systemic corrupt conduct in her Agency.
Clearly it is now time to expose this woman and her complete failure to comply with the Financial Management and Accountability Act. Also considering her failure to comply with the Bankruptcy Act for which she is responsible for, her evidence in court will assist in the exposure of of other government Agencies who have protected this shonky woman.
As Inspector General in Bankruptcy Ingram is required to comply with the Australian Public Service code of conduct.
It also is a requirement of this shonk to ensure that The Australian Financial Authority Australian is run efficiently, effectively and ethically.
Therefore it would appear the only way this completely shonky woman is able to run this Government Agency is with systemic corrupt conduct which is being protected by other Government Agencies.
In the statements to the Australian Federal Police Veronique Ingram, Adam Toma, Matthew Osborne, Mark Findlay and Cheryl Cullen have all complained that I have tarnished their reputations.
It should also be apparent to them that eventually someone was going to expose the systemic corrupt conduct in this government agency and obviously the best way that they should deal with it was to simply suck it up!
However Ingram and the shonky senior management at ITSA or AFSA greatly underestimated me when they asked the AFP to protect them from being exposed participating in this practice.
Instead of me bending over and taking it up my ARSE and pleading guilty to exposing this conduct at AFSA, the Inspector General and other senior staff are to be subpoenaed to court to explain their conduct
Before Tibor Karolyi left employment at the then ITSA he was asked why he had failed to comply with the Bankruptcy Act.
His reply was he was simply following instruction from "higher up"
At the time I considered he referred to Florence Choo and Guilia

Tuesday 19 November 2013

Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation/Adam Toma
This is were  the corrupt Adam Toma went 
after he left ITSA / AFSA
Adam toma protected fraud at ITSA 
and shonky Matthew Osborne Legal Officer 
also gave Legal advice on how to protect fraud
Adam Toma also protected systemic corrupt
conduct on the audit Committee.
Now the VCGLR is protecting the corrupt 
Adam Toma.
ITSA / AFSA have also now convinced 
 a Sydney Magistrate that systemic corrupt
conduct and corruption
must be protected in Government Agencies 
.
Licensing
Adam Toma
Director
Dual-licensed sector
Minor gaming
licences
Employee licensing
Liquor licensing
Gambling licences
and products
Proof of age
Gambling revenue
audit
Major licences &
venue management

Monday 18 November 2013

Veronique Ingram AFSA has magistrate protect systemic corrupt conduct.
So today in court 5.5 at the Downing center, ITSA successfully asked a magistrate to protect systemic corrupt conduct and corruption at AFSA/ ITSA. 
Despite the magistrate being made aware the the shonky Principal Legal Officer  Matthew Osborne is providing false and corrupt legal advice to protect Fraud and complaints   about both private trustees and the Official trustee this magistrate decided there was no legitimate forensic purpose for my request for a subpoena   and  in fact the subpoena was just " fishing" for evidence.
I found it quite amazing that the magistrate found it could be an" abuse of power" to   request  such a subpoena.
So the Government Solicitor  asked for costs which I also found amusing that I should pay for the Government Solicitor to protect systemic corrupt conduct. The magistrate said he was unable to grant his wish  as he had no jurisdiction but he could ask for it after committal hearings or some kind of shit like that.
I interpreted  it that  after Veronique Ingram  and   all the senior Management at AFSA including the corrupt Adam Toma had finished trying to explain why they all considered  corrupt conduct was to be protected  by the Australian Federal Police  then David Nuygen could ask for costs.
         It also appears that the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions also need another 2 weeks so some one else  could review my file and of course the AFP Agent Nathan Potter  was also there looking not as   enthusiastic  as before. It may be now the AFP are actually realising  that the whole matter was purely to intimidate me and protect the shonky conduct at ITSA / AFSA.
It would appear that everyone is tying themselves in knots   to protect their actions.


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Friday 15 November 2013

 AFSA  requests magistrate to protect corrupt conduct and  Corruption/  Veronique Ingram
So here is another great effort by Veronique Ingram and the Australian Financial Security Authority or the old ITSA to ask a magistrate in the  Downing Center Local Court to protect  systemic corrupt conduct and corruption.
Clearly I have a paper trail of Government Agencies protecting each other. It will be interesting on Tuesday to see which Magistrate is brave enough to put up their hand to say corruption and corrupt conduct must be protected at all costs

Monday 11 November 2013

Section 11C FOI  ACT/ Disclosure log

Commonwealth Consolidated Acts

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 1982 - SECT 11C

Publication of information in accessed documents
Scope
             (1)  This section applies to information if an agency or Minister gives a person access to a document under section 11A containing the information, except in the case of any of the following:
                     (a)  personal information about any person, if it would be unreasonable to publish the information;
                     (b)  information about the business, commercial, financial or professional affairs of any person, if it would be unreasonable to publish the information;
                     (c)  other information of a kind determined by the Information Commissioner under subsection (2), if it would be unreasonable to publish the information;
                     (d)  any information, if it is not reasonably practicable to publish the information under this section because of the extent of any modifications to a document (or documents) necessary to delete information mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c).
             (2)  The Information Commissioner may, by legislative instrument, make a determination for the purposes of paragraph (1)(c).
Publication
             (3)  The agency, or the Minister, must publish the information to members of the public generally on a website by:
                     (a)  making the information available for downloading from the website; or
                     (b)  publishing on the website a link to another website, from which the information can be downloaded; or
                     (c)  publishing on the website other details of how the information may be obtained.
             (4)  The agency may impose a charge on a person for accessing the information only if:
                     (a)  the person does not directly access the information by downloading it from the website (or another website); and
                     (b)  the charge is to reimburse the agency for a specific reproduction cost, or other specific incidental costs, incurred in giving the person access to that particular information.
             (5)  If there is a charge for accessing the information, the agency or Minister must publish details of the charge in the same way as the information is published under this section.
Time limit for publication
             (6)  The agency or Minister must comply with this section within 10 working days after the day the person is given access to the document.
             (7)  In this section:
"working day" means a day that is not:
                     (a)  a Saturday; or
                     (b)  a Sunday; or
                     (c)  a public holiday in the place where the function of publishing the information under this section is to be performed.


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 FOI ACT S 11A

Commonwealth Consolidated Acts

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 1982 - SECT 11A

Access to documents on request
Scope
             (1)  This section applies if:
                     (a)  a request is made by a person, in accordance with subsection 15(2), to an agency or Minister for access to:
                              (i)  a document of the agency; or
                             (ii)  an official document of the Minister; and
                     (b)  any charge that, under the regulations, is required to be paid before access is given has been paid.
             (2)  This section applies subject to this Act.
Note:          Other provisions of this Act are relevant to decisions about access to documents, for example the following:
(a)    section 12 (documents otherwise available);
(b)    section 13 (documents in national institutions);
(c)    section 15A (personnel records);
(d)    section 22 (access to edited copies with exempt or irrelevant matter deleted).
Mandatory access--general rule
             (3)  The agency or Minister must give the person access to the document in accordance with this Act, subject to this section.
Exemptions and conditional exemptions
             (4)  The agency or Minister is not required by this Act to give the person access to the document at a particular time if, at that time, the document is an exempt document.
Note:          Access may be given to an exempt document apart from under this Act, whether or not in response to a request (see section 3A
(objects--information or documents otherwise accessible)).
             (5)  The agency or Minister must give the person access to the document if it is conditionally exempt at a particular time unless (in the circumstances) access to the document at that time would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.
Note 1:       Division 3 of Part IV provides for when a document is conditionally exempt.
Note 2:       A conditionally exempt document is an exempt document if access to the document would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest (see section 31B (exempt documents for the purposes of Part IV)).
Note 3:       Section 11B deals with when it is contrary to the public interest to give a person access to the document.
             (6)  Despite subsection (5), the agency or Minister is not required to give access to the document at a particular time if, at that time, the document is both:
                     (a)  a conditionally exempt document; and
                     (b)  an exempt document:
                              (i)  under Division 2 of Part IV (exemptions); or
                             (ii)  within the meaning of paragraph (b) or (c) of the definition of exempt document in subsection 4(1).


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